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<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="../assets/xml/rss.xsl" media="all"?><rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"><channel><title>TAPPMATH (Posts about Wisdom of Crowds)</title><link>https://blog.tappmath.com/</link><description></description><atom:link rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" href="https://blog.tappmath.com/categories/wisdom-of-crowds.xml"></atom:link><language>en</language><copyright>Contents © 2020 &lt;a href="mailto:tappmathblog@tappmath.com"&gt;Darren Tapp&lt;/a&gt; </copyright><lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2020 21:21:00 GMT</lastBuildDate><generator>Nikola (getnikola.com)</generator><docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs><item><title>The Wisdom of the Masternodes</title><link>https://blog.tappmath.com/posts/the-wisdom-of-the-masternodes/</link><dc:creator>Darren Tapp</dc:creator><description>&lt;div&gt;&lt;p&gt;Oddly, there have been several occasions when markets reacted as if they had a
better understanding of events than should have been possible.  This happens
often enough that it's difficult to blame these phenomena solely on insider
trading.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When witness to the results of a Dash Network voting cycle, I have often been
perplexed about the decisions made by the masternodes.  I have been surprised to
see existing valuable infrastructure defunded, for example. However, I believe
these decisions have been ultimately proven wise as time unfolds. It is easy to
be upset about withheld or terminated funding. But it is also difficult to
identify the opportunities made available by those freed resources. If I had to
judge the Dash DAO as an entity by the decisions that it has made, I would judge
this entity to be wise. I lament that the DAO cannot manifest and explain its
reasoning.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I believe there is wisdom behind the decision of the DAO not to fund recent DIF
proposals. I believe the DAO has identified how interests have gotten
out-of-whack. Muddled. I believe the DAO is holding out until the DIF can
demonstrate a more efficient use of resources. I believe this so strongly, that
I am putting my time where my mouth is by becoming a DIF protector.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;A Conflict of Interest&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Let us consider a masternode owner, Alice. Alice pays $20 a month for access to
a server where she runs the software required to service the Dash Network.
Alice's node serves the network and is placed on the rewards queue. Alice waits
patiently as every other node is called before hers, and then her number comes
up and she receives 1.44236253 DASH and fees as a payment. Alice faithfully
researches proposals every cycle and offers up her vote.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Alice then notices that there is a proposal for the DIF that would fund a
masternode run by the DIF. Alice understands that another masternode would
incrementally lengthen the line at the payment queue. Alice also understands
that if the DIF runs masternodes then her veto as part of the DAO will be
similarly diluted. For these reasons alone Alice might not vote to fund the
DIF.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A DIF that seeks funding from the DAO for the purpose of running masternodes,
even if run through a third party, will always make their proposals
incrementally less attractive. Such a DIF is a competitor to masternode owners,
like Alice. Despite the fact that the DIF is supposedly working hand-in-hand
with the DAO, we may even go as far to say that such a DIF is instead marginally
adversarial to Alice and therefore even the DAO.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Trolls on the Internet&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Having been around for a while I see some people on the internet argue that Dash
Core Group (DCG) should not run masternodes. This is a straw man argument since
DCG does not run masternodes.  However, the same conflict of interest would
apply if they did.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There are those that misrepresent facts and extend this line of reasoning,
arguing that contractors paid by DCG should not run masternodes. That argument
simply doesn't follow though. People who have an interest in a masternode are
naturally going to be incented to do beneficial work for DCG. As long as the
payment is representative of the value provided, there simply is no conflict of
interest. This argument gets even weaker when it is considered that some working
for DCG are working for no, or reduced pay (note that we hope this situation
will improve in months to come).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;More than Money&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Money is meaningless if it doesn't buy anything. I would expect the DIF to hedge
in order to protect wealth. Running a masternode sets up a game theoretic
situation that is not conducive to cooperation.  I hope the DIF can convert
money into assets that add value instead of using money to dilute the value of
running a masternode.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description><category>Dash</category><category>Dash Investment Foundation</category><category>DIF</category><category>Game Theory</category><category>Masternodes</category><category>Nash Equilibrium</category><category>Wisdom of Crowds</category><guid>https://blog.tappmath.com/posts/the-wisdom-of-the-masternodes/</guid><pubDate>Sat, 01 Aug 2020 08:49:21 GMT</pubDate></item></channel></rss>